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1It’s Political: How the Salience of One’s Political Identity Changes Climate Change
Beliefs and Policy Support
Unsworth, K. L., & Fielding, K. S. (2014). It's political: How the salience of one's political identity
changes climate change beliefs and policy support. Global Environmental Change, 27, 131-137.
Previous research has demonstrated a striking difference in climate change beliefs and
policy support between people who identify with the right-wing of politics and with the left-wing of
politics. But are we destined to continue with this divergence? We suggest that there is movement
around these differences based on the politicization of climate change and we conducted two
experimental studies with 126 and 646 people, respectively, to examine this effect. We found that
those people whose political identity was made salient were less likely to believe in an
anthropogenic cause of climate change and less likely to support government climate change
policies than those whose identity was not made salient; particularly when those people were
aligned with the right-wing of politics. The results demonstrate the importance of the salience of
one’s political identity in determining attitudes and beliefs even for scientific facts such as climate
change. Our research also identifies some ways forward in dealing with climate change based on
depoliticizing the issue.
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1. Introduction
Research shows that a person’s political
orientation affects their beliefs about climate
change: Those on the left-wing of politics
(e.g., Democrats in the US and Labor
supporters in the UK and Australia) are
more likely to accept the reality of
anthropogenic climate change than those on
the right-wing of politics (e.g., US Republican
and UK/Australian Conservative supporters)
(Dunlap and McCright, 2008, McCright and
Dunlap, 2011, Fielding et al., 2012,
McCright, 2011, Poortinga et al., 2011). But
how does such a divergence occur and is it
immutable? We suggest that it is the salience
of one’s political social identity that creates
the disparity between left and right-wing
supporters—that the politicization of climate
change affects one’s belief about the cause of
climate change and one’s support for policies
to deal with it. Thus, we should be able to
affect this disparity by making a person’s
political identity salient. This research aims to
demonstrate this effect in the politicized
2realm of climate change and therefore to
highlight possible interventions.
The politicization of climate change has often
been suggested to be at the heart of the
decline in public support for dealing with
climate change (e.g., Hart and Nisbet, 2012,
McCright and Dunlap, 2011) but, to date, no
one has tested that premise experimentally.
Correlational studies have found that, at a
country-level, the attitudes of the political
leaders were related to citizen’s
environmental attitudes (Yin, 1999),and that,
over time, public support co-varies with elite
cues from politicians about their
environmental beliefs (Brulle et al., 2012)
and economic uncertainty (Brulle et al.,
2012, Scruggs and Benegal, 2012). In the
current study we conduct experimental
research that tests the causal relationship
between political identity salience and climate
change beliefs and attitudes. While political
identification has been shown to affect
attitudes for obvious political issues such as
welfare reform, health care reform and
affirmative action (e.g., Dancey and Goren,
2010), to our knowledge little research has
experimentally tested the relationship
between political identity and science-based
issues such as climate change. We draw on
social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner,
1986) as the theoretical basis for this
relationship and show how making identity
salient can influence attitudes and beliefs
around a scientific, fact-based argument.
1.1 Social identity and political identity
salience
We base our argument for politicisation on
the social identity approach that encompasses
social identity theory and self-categorization
theory. Attitudes and beliefs are affected by
the social groups to which one belongs
(Tajfel and Turner, 1986, Turner et al.,
1994), sometimes to an even greater extent
than by our own personal identity (Onorato
and Turner, 2004). The social identity
approach proposes that when a person
consciously identifies with a group, they take
on the known characteristics and beliefs of
that group (Ashforth and Mael, 1989, Tajfel
and Turner, 1986, Hornsey, 2008). Social
identities may be more or less chronically
salient but cues from the social context can
heighten the salience of a social identity
(Turner et al., 1994). The provision of
comparative information about relevant
outgroups (e.g., Haslam et al., 1995,
Rabinovich et al., 2012, Tarrant and Butler,
2011) and questions that prime people to
focus on a particular identity (e.g., Haslam et
al., 1999) are examples of contextual cues
that can make identity salient. When a
particular social identity becomes salient, the
norms of that identity provide guidance about
how to think, feel, and act (Hornsey, 2008),
especially when people are highly identified
with that identity (Fielding et al., 2008, Terry
et al., 1999, Ellemers et al., 1999). Thus, the
salience of a social identity is a particular
form of priming that goes beyond simple
attitude accessibility (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974, Krosnick and Kinder,
1990).
This theoretical perspective has been
extended to the political domain (see Huddy,
2001) where research has shown that the
strength of political identity influences
judgements of political ingroup and outgroup
members (Morton et al., 2007, Kelly, 1989),
3that the salience of regional identity is related
to the interpretation of political
developments (Huici, Cano, Hopkins,
Emler, & Carmona, 1997), and that making a
superordinate national identity salient can
increase acceptance of policies that favour
minority sub-groups (Transue, 2007). Cohen
(2003) provides a particularly vivid example
of how political identity salience can
transform attitudes: In his study highly
identified Democrat and Republican
supporters were more likely to endorse a
welfare policy that was supported by the
majority of their party members, even when
the policy was antithetical to their own beliefs
or the party’s broader value system.
Situational political cues exist throughout
everyday life in the media, workplaces, social
discussions and so forth; and as such, one’s
political identity is likely to often be made
salient.
We propose that the social identity
perspective offers a theoretically plausible
explanation for the processes operating in the
political landscape whereby people’s
responses to the scientific facts of climate
change are guided by the attitudes and
expressed positions of their political party
elites. There is little understanding of climate
science in the general community and
therefore knowledge and understanding of
global climate change is often flawed
(Sunblad et al., 2009, Bord et al., 2000). One
way people can deal with their lack of
knowledge is to look for cues from associated
political elites. In other words, when a person
identifies with a political party that is clearly
against climate change mitigation and
adaptation he or she will hold beliefs that
align with that political party. On the other
hand, if he or she identifies with a political
party that is in support of climate change
mitigation and adaptation then he/she will
also be more likely to support this position
on climate change individually. However,
identities are not fixed and may change in
response to input from the social context.
When talking to your child, your identity as a
parent is likely to be salient; when thinking
about statistical analyses your researcher
identity is likely to be salient. Based on this
perspective, we propose that the divergence
in climate change beliefs and support along
party lines can change and that it will increase
when people’s political identities are salient.
More specifically, we hypothesise that when
people’s political identity is salient they are
more likely to present beliefs about climate
change that are in line with their political
orientation than when their political identity
is not salient.
A promising aspect of the social identity
analysis of the politicization of climate change
is the potential for change. According to the
social identity perspective, if the normative
stance of a political party changes, this will in
turn change the opinions and beliefs of those
who identify with the political party.
Conceptualizing the politicization of climate
change in social identity terms therefore
highlights the malleability of climate change
beliefs and suggests avenues for change.
To demonstrate the effect of political identity
salience on responses to climate change we
conducted two studies that examined the
hypothesis that political identity salience will
influence climate change beliefs and support
for policies that address climate change. In
both studies, we made people’s political
identity salient and reminded them of the
4different stance (i.e., the normative positions)
taken by the two main political groups in
Australia. The first study drew on a university
student sample to investigate the effect of
making the students’ political identities
salient on their beliefs about anthropogenic
climate change. We then conducted a second
study to replicate and generalise the findings
to a much broader segment of the Australian
population and to extend the results to look
not only at climate change beliefs but also at
the effects on support for climate change
policies. Showing that beliefs about climate
change and support for climate change policy
are different depending on the salience of
political identity is critical as it suggests the
potential for change and the possibility that
climate change attitudes could become less
polarized with reduced politicization.
1.1 Study Context
In the Australian context, there is striking
political partisanship around climate change
beliefs and mitigation support, particularly in
the more conservative parties. In recent
years, those in the Labor party (centre left-
oriented) have shown a belief in
anthropogenic climate change but the
language they have used around the need to
mitigate climate change has lessened
somewhat following a media backlash. On
the other side of politics, the beliefs are much
stronger: The conservative parties have
avowed that they will abolish the carbon
pricing scheme introduced by the previously
governing Labor party and the leadership of
the party still expresses doubts around the
science of climate change. Given this
partisanship we hypothesise that people who
identify with the right will be less likely to
attribute climate change to human causes and
less likely to support climate change policies
when their political identity is salient
compared to those for whom political
identity is not salient. In contrast, people who
identify with the left whose political identity is
made salient will be more likely to attribute
climate change to human causes and be more
likely to support climate change policies
compared to those whose political identity is
not salient.
2. Study 1
2.1 Methods
2.1.1 Participants
One hundred and twenty-six university
students participated in the study. The
sample was 56.8% male, with a mean age of
18.9 years (and a standard deviation of 2.2
years). Political orientation varied across
participants: 28.1% said that their most
dominant political orientation was with the
Labor Party (centre-left wing); 47.5% aligned
with the Liberal Party (right wing); 7.2%
aligned with the Greens Party (left wing);
3.6% aligned with Independents; and 2.9%
aligned with the National Party (rural right
wing).
2.1.2 Procedure and Measures
At the beginning of the experiment (and
prior to the political identity salience
manipulation for the experimental condition)
participants were asked about their
environmental attitude with the question:
“How important to you is protecting the
environment?” Participants responded on a
five point scale from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (A
great deal). This question was one of a
number of other questions assessing life goals
5(e.g., How important to you is not standing
out from the crowd?) and thus the inclusion
of the question was unlikely to have caused
any environmental or political priming. This
question served as a control for
environmental values.
Participants were then randomly allocated to
one of two conditions: a control group in
which political identity was not made salient
or an experimental group in which political
identity was made salient. There was no
discussion of politics or political identity for
the control group before the questions about
climate change. In the experimental
condition, we manipulated social identity
salience based on established methods from
social psychology (Mirisola et al., 2007;
Reynolds, Turner, Haslam, & Ryan, 2001).
Specifically, we asked participants, “In this
study we are interested in the opinions of
different people concerning climate change.
In particular, the aim of this section is to
make comparisons between those who
support the Liberal or Nationals parties, and
those who support the Labor or Green
parties. First, we are interested in what
characteristics describe people who support
the Liberal or Nationals parties compared to
people who support the Labor or Green
parties. What are three words that
characterise people who support the Liberal
or National parties? What are three words
that characterise people who support the
Labor or Green parties?” We than asked
them, “If you had to choose, who would you
say you supported most?” and participants
were given the option of either “Liberal or
National parties” or “Labor or Greens
parties”. This political identity salience
manipulation proved to be strong with the
adjectives used to describe the two parties
being extremely polarised, for example:
“have a brain” for right-wing and
“uneducated mungbean hippies” for left
wing; and “unfortunate, mislead,
uninformed” for right-wing and “considerate,
thoughtful, forward-thinking” for left-wing.
Any participants who did not write down
three words for each party or who did not
know/not care which party they identified
with were deemed not to have participated in
the political identity salience manipulation
and were omitted from the analyses. This
resulted in 11 people being omitted from the
analyses.
To ensure that all participants were fully
aware of the stance taken by their political
parties we also included a short paragraph
describing the stances on climate change
policy taken by both the Labor Party (centre-
left party who were in government at the time
of the research) and by the coalition of the
Liberal and National Parties (who were in
opposition at the time of the research). These
statements were taken from information that
was on the Parties’ websites in February
2013. The additional information was as
follows:
“There is currently a great deal of debate
amongst politicians regarding climate change
and the policies surrounding it. The Labor
Government believes that humans are at least
partly to blame for climate change. They
have put a price on carbon and have policies
for reducing pollution and making power
stations cleaner, giving tax breaks for green
buildings and setting emissions standards for
cars, amongst others. As reported in the
media, some members of the Liberal Party
have said that they do not believe in the
6existence of climate change or that humans
contribute to it; but other members of the
Liberal Party have said that they do believe
that humans contribute to climate change.
The Coalition's policy on climate change is
centred on local actions, such as funding for
planting trees and solar homes, solar schools
and solar towns. The Coalition has a policy
of scrapping the price on carbon if it is
elected to government.”
At the end of the experiment we asked
participants in both the experimental and
control conditions, “How much do you think
humans contribute to/cause climate change
(as a percentage)?” and they provided their
response on a sliding scale from 0 to 100%.
Finally, in the demographics section at the
end of the survey, we asked all participants,
“What is your most dominant political
orientation?” As participants resided in
Australia they chose from the Labor Party,
Liberal Party, Nationals Party, Greens Party,
or Independent. The response to this
question was used to classify participants as
left-wing (Labor Party or Greens Party) or
right-wing (Liberal Party or Nationals Party).
2.2 Results
We ran a 2 (political orientation: left-wing,
right-wing) x 2 (political identity salience: low,
high) analysis of variances (ANOVA) on
belief in anthropogenic climate change to see
whether salience of political identity affected
views on anthropogenic climate change. The
analysis revealed that the significant main
effects of political identity salience (F(1,103)
= 6.37, p<.05) and political orientation
(F(1,103) = 6.20, p<.05) on beliefs about the
percentage of climate change caused by
humans were qualified by the hypothesised
significant interaction between the salience
condition and the person’s political
orientation (F(1,103) = 7.01, p<.01).
Moreover, the same analyses controlling for
existing environmental attitudes,
demonstrated that these relationships were
robust (see Table 1). As can be seen in
Figure 1, the interaction showed that the
perceived human contribution to climate
change was significantly lower for people who
identified with the right-wing of politics and
whose political identity was made salient
(64.4%) than those people who identified
with the right-wing of politics but whose
political identity was not made salient (40.5%)
(F(1,102) = 13.48, p<.001). For those on the
left-wing of politics, there was no significant
difference in perception of human
contribution to climate change between those
whose political identity was made salient and
those whose identity was not made salient
(F(1,102) = .01, ns).
A limitation of the first study is that it was
conducted with university students. Students
participate in every-day life like any other
citizen and as such are a valid source of
information about climate change beliefs; at
the same time though, they represent only
one segment of the population. To this end,
we sought to replicate our results with a larger
sample, generalise these results to a broader
population and test the hypotheses in relation
to support for government policies on
climate change.
3. Study 2
3.1 Methods
3.1.1 Participants
Seven hundred and thirty-six people
participated in the second experiment. The
7research participants enrolled through
Qualtrics, an accredited permission-based
panel survey organisation. The sample came
from across Australia and was mixed in terms
of gender (50.0% male), age (ranged from 18
to 84 years old with a mean age of 50.93
years old and a standard deviation of 15.28
years), and education (38.3% had a highest
qualification as high school or junior high
school, 31.4% had a trade or technical
qualification, 21.7% had a Bachelor degree,
and 7.9% had a Masters or PhD
qualification). The sample varied also across
political orientation with 31.7% aligning with
the Labor Party, 29.1% aligning with the
Liberal Party, 15.5% aligning with
Independents, 9.4% aligning with the Greens
Party and 3.4% aligning with the National
Party.
3.1.2 Measures and Procedure
The procedure in this study was exactly the
same as that in Study 1. Like Study 1,
participants were randomly assigned to a
control group (N=335) or an experimental
group in which political identity was made
salient (N=401). Similar to Study 1, we
deleted data from people who did not
participate in the experimental manipulation
(i.e., those who did not write down three
words describing the different groups). This
resulted in the data from 69 people being
deleted. In addition, data from 21 people
who did not respond accurately to a set of
questions designed to test participant
involvement (a measure of cognitive
complexity; Woehr et al., 1998) were also
deleted as they were deemed not to have
taken the questionnaire seriously. Thus, data
from 646 people were analysed (331 in the
control group and 315 in the experimental
group).
The only change in measures from Study 1
was that we asked two additional questions
that assessed support for climate change
policies. Following the question regarding
anthropogenic climate change beliefs we also
asked, “How do you feel about what the
government is doing to address climate
change?” and participants responded on a
scale from 1 (Not doing enough – needs to
do a lot more) to 5 (Doing too much – needs
to do a lot less). Second, we asked specifically
about the carbon pricing policy that was
introduced by the Labor government and
which has been particularly politically
charged. Participants were asked: “To what
extent do you agree with the policy of putting
a price on carbon?” and participants
responded on a scale from 1 (Strongly
disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree).
3.2 Results
Similar to Study 1 we controlled for
participants’ existing environmental attitudes
as a more rigorous test of our hypotheses.
We ran a two-way ANOVA to examine the
effect of the political salience manipulation
and political orientation on people’s beliefs
about the percentage of climate change
caused by humans (see Table 2). Consistent
with Study 1, the main effect of political
orientation (right-wing participants had less
belief in anthropogenic climate change than
left-wing participants) was qualified by the
expected significant interaction (F(1,520) =
6.09, p<.05). Simple effects tests showed that
people who identified with the right-wing had
lower perceptions of the amount of
anthropogenic climate change when their
political identity was salient (44.7%)
8compared to those whose political identity
was not made salient (36.0%) (F(1,520) =
6.88, p<.01). Those who identified with the
left wing whose political identity was made
salient had somewhat higher perceptions of
the amount of anthropogenic climate change
compared to those whose political identity
was not made salient (67.0% compared to
64.7%, respectively), however this difference
was not significant (F(1,520) = .93, ns).
We then ran the same analyses to examine
the effects of the political salience
manipulation and political orientation on
policy support (see Table 2). As expected,
the main effects of political salience
manipulation and political orientation were
qualified by a significant interaction on
attitudes towards government action
(F(1,514) = 6.20, p<.05): Participants who
identified with the right-wing of politics and
whose political identity was made salient had
significantly higher beliefs that the
government was doing too much than those
who were on the right-wing but whose
identity was not made salient, (F(1,514) =
12.20, p<.001); there were no attitudinal
differences due to identity salience, however,
for those who identified with the left-wing of
politics (F(1,514) = .02, ns). When we
examined support for a particular policy,
namely putting a price on carbon, we again
found a significant interaction (F(1,520) =
3.73, p=.05). While the simple slopes were
not significant in and of themselves, the plot
of the significant interaction (shown in Figure
1) shows that compared to the left-wing
participants whose identity was not made
salient, people on the left whose political
identity was made salient had stronger
support for a price on carbon (F(1,520) =
2.51, ns), while compared to the right-wing
participants whose identity was not made
salient, people on the right whose political
identity was made salient had weaker support
for a price on carbon (F(1,520) = 1.36, ns).
To check the robustness of the findings, the
same analyses were conducted with the left-
wing categorisation based only on Labor
Party supporters, i.e., without those who
identified with the Greens party. No
differences in results were found; detailed
results are available upon request to the first
author. In essence, the salience of one’s
political identity affects one’s stated beliefs
and attitudes towards climate change and
dealing with climate change, particularly for
those on the right of politics.
4. Discussion
In the current studies we go beyond past
research that has examined the relationship
between political orientation and climate
change beliefs and attitudes by providing
experimental evidence of this relationship.
We demonstrated across two studies that
beliefs became more polarised when political
identity was made salient compared to when
it was not salient thereby establishing a causal
relationship between political identity and
momentary attitudes and beliefs around the
scientific fact of climate change. Our findings
show that right-wing students and community
members whose political identity was made
salient believed less in an anthropogenic
cause of climate change and had lower
support for climate change policies than
those on the right-wing whose political
identity was not made salient. In other words,
their own stance on the issue was more
9aligned with the party’s stance when this
identity was salient.
The polarisation of politics in Australia, the
US, the UK and other countries has been
proposed to have led to an us-and-them
phenomenon whereby politicians have taken
opposing views on climate change (McCright
and Dunlap, 2011) amongst many other
policy positions. Our research replicated
previous findings with main effect differences
between those on the left and right of politics
for belief in anthropogenic climate change,
for support for the amount of government
action on climate change, and for support for
a policy on carbon pricing. We suggest that
the politicisation of climate change that has
already occurred to date has embedded these
beliefs and attitudes even when a person is
not thinking about political identity. Indeed,
the fact that we found that the most change
occurred for those who identified with the
right may account for the overall worsening
in public support that has been seen in many
countries.
On the other hand, by showing that the
differences are most acute when political
identity is salient, our research suggests that
there is some “wiggle-room” around these
embedded differences. Given how often
one’s political identity is brought to mind
through media, workplace and social cues,
the salience of a person’s political identity
matters; in our study it significantly altered
climate change beliefs and support for those
on the right of politics. It is also likely that
these differences may be occurring during
polling of climate change attitudes and
beliefs. If a participant is asked about their
political orientation (or their political identity
is made salient in any other way) before
questions about climate change are asked,
then the responses are likely to be biased by
this salience. This is a methodological
problem, but it also has substantial societal
implications. Notably, humans are affected
by what we believe to be the normative
beliefs; if we believe that a lot of people do
not believe in anthropogenic causes of
climate change then we are less likely to
believe it too. Thus, a vicious circle could be
occurring where responses to polls are
polarised due to political identity salience,
which is then publicised as the normative set
of beliefs, thus further polarising future
respondents.
Interestingly, we found that it was those who
identified with the right-wing of politics who
were most affected by making political
identity salient. This could be because of the
rather crude and simple categorisation into
“left wing” and “right wing” that was used in
our research; while this is the traditional
approach, it could be that more sophisticated
categorisations may reveal a more nuanced
response from left-wing respondents.
However, our findings could also be due to
the Australian political context at the time the
data were collected. The Labor party held
power in a minority government made
possible by the Greens party and as part of
that coalition had introduced a carbon
pricing policy that attracted community and
media backlash. As a point of distinction the
conservative parties were clearly and
explicitly opposed to carbon pricing and less
explicitly but still occasionally opposed to
climate change science. Our findings suggest
that when political identity became salient,
conservative participants polarised toward
their own party and away from the current
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government stance. The same polarisation
did not emerge for the left-wing participants.
The social identity perspective proposes that
intergroup comparisons should maximize
differences between groups (Hogg, Tuner, &
Davidson, 1990; Oakes, Haslam & Turner,
1994). In the case of conservative
participants, polarisation toward their own
group position helps achieve this distinction
through differentiating them from the left-
wing who currently held power and had a
clear position on climate change. This same
polarisation may not have emerged for left-
wing participants as their party had achieved
this distinctiveness through their current
stance and policies. Moreover, the
government’s rhetoric on climate change had
shifted from the “greatest moral, economic
and social challenge of our time” (Rudd,
2007) to putting “the problem of climate
change in its proper context” (Gillard, 2010)
suggesting that the normative cues were
toward a more moderate position.
Interestingly, research has found that
conservatives have a greater resistance to
change and support for preserving the
existing order (Jost et al., 2003) which may
make it more likely for right-wing than left-
wing participants to polarise on the issue of
climate change when their identity is made
salient. Nonetheless, future research is
needed in a different political context and
with a different political categorisation before
we can determine whether the non-significant
result for those on the left-wing of politics is
due to methodological considerations or
substantive considerations.
The finding that right-wing participants’
position on climate change was fluid and
moved around in response to political
identity cues is encouraging in that it suggests
the possibility of shifting people in a more
positive direction. Practically, we believe that
our research highlights at least three ways in
which we can increase public engagement in
dealing with climate change. First, given that
in most of the results the effect of political
identity salience occurred for people who
identified with the right-wing, messages aimed
at this segment of the populace may be most
influential. If making political identity salient
moves people toward their party’s stance
then a critical issue will be to provide people
who identify with the right with alternative
perspectives from within their party. A
political leader from the right-wing of politics
who believes in anthropogenic climate
change could lead those on the right to more
readily accept anthropogenic climate change
and the policies needed to address it, as
messages that emanate from in-group
members are more influential than those
from out-group members (Mackie et al.,
1992, see Wood, 2000 for a review,
Hornsey, 2005). While this might seem like a
pipe-dream it has in fact happened in the UK
where David Cameron is the current
Conservative Prime Minister, and in
Australia when Malcolm Turnbull was leader
of the Liberal (centre-right) party. Second,
linking climate change discussion to identities
with norms that are more congruent with
climate change action is another strategy that
could help to reduce the politicization of
climate change. For example, it may prove
fruitful to link climate change discussions to
an identity like “parent” or “grandparent” as
care for future generations is central to these
identities and climate change is set to provide
a substantial threat to these future
generations. Finally, the way that messages
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about climate change are framed can
significantly influence responses to climate
change and may be an avenue to diffuse
polarised responses that result from political
partisanship (e.g., Nisbet, 2009, Morton et
al., 2011, Spence and Pidgeon, 2010, Gifford
and Comeau, 2011, Corner, 2013). For
example, Feygina and colleagues (2010)
showed increased support for environmental
action when messages where framed in ways
that appealed to conservative values and,
similarly, both Bain and colleagues (2012)
and Unsworth and McNeill (2013) showed
that climate change sceptics and the general
population were more likely to take pro-
environmental action when climate change
action was framed in terms of valued
outcomes.
Conclusion
We believe that our research provides a
glimmer of hope that differences between
those on the left and right of politics could be
reduced on the issue of climate change. We
have identified three strategies that could
help to achieve this. We agree that it may
take some time to eliminate the politicization
of climate change, but our results suggest that
it is one direction that could lead to greater
action for dealing with climate change.
12
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Table 1. Analysis of Differences in Perceived Human Contribution to Climate Change for Political
Identity Salience Manipulation and Political Orientation in Study 1
Perceived Human Contribution to Climate Change
Intercept F(1,102) = 17.80***
Environmental Attitude F(1,102) = 5.53*
Political Identity Salience manipulation F(1,102) = 5.52*
Political Orientation F(1,102) = 4.13*
Manipulation * Orientation Interaction F(1,102) = 6.05*
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 2. Analysis of Differences in Perceived Human Contribution to Climate Change,
Government Action, and Policy Support for Political Identity Salience Manipulation and Political
Orientation in Study 2
Perceived Human
Contribution to
Climate Change
Government Action Support for Carbon
Pricing Policy
Intercept F(1,520) = 11.74** F(1,514) = 513.12*** F(1,520) = 62.62***
Environmental Goal F(1,520) = 68.66*** F(1,514) = 27.78*** F(1,520) = 27.39***
Political Salience
Manipulation
F(1,520) = 1.36 F(1,514) = 7.13** F(1,520) = .04
Political Orientation F(1,520) = 105.15*** F(1,514) = 60.43*** F(1,520) = 203.72***
Manipulation *
Orientation Interaction
F(1,520) = 6.09* F(1,514) = 6.20* F(1,520) = 3.73t
t p=.05, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
